ARGUMENT

Moral Status of Animals: Arguments From Having a Soul Revisited

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Abstract: In this article, I consider a number of arguments that assume that beings who have immortal souls occupy a special position in the sphere of moral concern. First, I place these arguments in their historical and cultural contexts. Next, I formulate several conditions of adequacy that all such arguments must satisfy. Subsequently, I distinguish two different general kinds of such arguments: Inclusionary arguments *attempt to use the immortality of soul as a criterion for either including someone into a sphere of morality while excluding others or, at least, for elevating someone's position within this sphere.* Modifying arguments *attempt to strengthen or weaken moral considerations that already apply to a being included into the sphere of morality. I argue that, although some modifying arguments may fulfill all conditions of adequacy, they have very little practical importance.*

Key words: obligations to animals, animal rights, moral status of animals, immortal souls, animal souls

PRELIMINARIES: THE MORAL STATUS OF ANIMALS

Let us assume, for the sake of this article, what follows:

> (MS) A being has a *moral standing* (and thus is included into a sphere of morality) if and only if the moral evaluation of our actions (i.e., whether or not they are obligatory, right, permissible, wrong, forbidden, and so on) *intrinsically* (and not just *accidentally*) depends on how this being is affected.

This way of defining "moral standing" (sometimes alternatively called "moral status" or "moral considerability") is standard among English-speaking philosophers. Tom Regan (1982, p. 203) adopted a nearly identical definition. Similarly, according to Tom Beauchamp and James Childress (2009), to have moral status is "to deserve the respect and protection accorded by moral norms and this can only be accorded to entities that can be morally wronged by actions" (p. 66). Also, according to Jaworska and Tannenbaum (2018):

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> An entity has moral status if and only if it or its interests morally matter to some degree for the entity's own sake. For instance, an animal may be said to have moral status if its suffering is at least somewhat morally bad, on account of this animal itself and regardless of the consequences for other beings. (opening paragraph)

(MS) has two general features: First, it is neutral with regard to theories determining who or what has a moral standing. In principle, such a theory may be spelled out in terms of someone's having moral rights (see Regan, 1983), or someone being a proper object of direct moral duties, or someone's instantiating some intrinsically valuable states of affairs such as pleasure and pain or the satisfaction and frustration of preferences (see Sencerz, 2011, 2020; Singer, 1975, 1993), or someone being essentially included into a scope of virtuous behavior, and so on.[1] Second, (MS) does not imply that everyone within the sphere of morality has exactly the same moral status (e.g., that everyone has the same basic moral rights or is object of the same basic direct duties, etc.). Thus, for example, Jaworska and Tannenbaum (2018) introduce the concepts of *full moral status* and *degrees of moral status*; the latter concept allowing for a possibility of a moral hierarchy among beings who are within the moral sphere.[2]

Beginning with the decade of the 1970s, a number of authors started to develop views implying that animals ought to be included into a sphere of morality and, furthermore, that they should be treated as moral equals to humans. This is the case because, once we fully examine our most basic moral principles in their applications to humans (especially to those who are seriously mentally impaired), it turns out that the very same principles also apply to animals. In practical terms, these principles imply that we should radically change our attitudes toward raising animals for food (especially if they are raised on factory farms); stop a great majority of experiments on animals; abandon the practice of keeping animals in zoos, water parks, and circuses; and stop many forms of hunting (and especially trophy hunting). Arguments for the conclusions of these sorts have been presented, for example, by Peter Singer (1975, 1993) and by Tom Regan (1982; 1983). There are, of course, serious differences between Singer's and Regan's positions. Singer represents a broadly consequentialist approach. By contrast, Regan's position is developed in terms of rights and especially the right not to be harmed. His neo-Kantian position assumes that we can and should ascribe to both humans and animals a kind of "inherent value" that is not reducible to utility that its possessor may have for others.

Predictably, these lines of arguments met with a philosophical pushback. Many philosophers have argued that there are criteria allowing us to include into the sphere of morality all and only humans (including those who are severely mentally diminished). In particular, a claim that only humans have immortal souls has been taken to provide a valid criterion for including humans, but excluding animals, from this sphere.

In the next section, I will put various arguments based on the idea having an immortal soul into their historical and cultural contexts. Next, I will formulate four conditions of adequacy that all such arguments have to satisfy to support their purported conclusions. Subsequently, I will distinguish two different general kinds of these arguments: *Inclusionary arguments* attempt to use the immortality of a soul as a criterion for either including someone into a sphere of morality or, at least, elevating someone's position within this

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sphere; *modifying arguments* attempt to strengthen or weaken moral considerations that apply to a being independently of this being having the prospect of immortality. I will argue that although some modifying arguments may fulfill all conditions of adequacy, they have relatively little practical importance.

ARGUMENTS FROM HAVING AN IMMORTAL SOUL IN THEIR HISTORICAL AND CULTURAL CONTEXTS

Since time immemorial, various cultures and their underlying myths, texts, and philosophies have been pointing to the immortality of souls as something of enormous moral importance—maybe even crucial in determining how we *ought to* conduct ourselves. To begin, all three classical Eastern systems originating on the Indian subcontinent (Hinduism, Jainism, and Buddhism) put emphasis on the ideal of *ahimsa* (i.e., the principle of nonharming but treating others with respect and kindness). All three assumed that ahimsa would be exemplified by a perfect sage and, to various degrees, all three included nonhuman animals in this principle's scope (see Chapple, 1993, especially Chapter 1). In this respect, Jainism went perhaps the furthest. As John M. Koller (2012) observed:

> *Ahimsa*, nonhurting, is the basis of Jain morality, for ultimately all questions of good and evil and right or wrong come down to whether or not the thought, speech, or action in question hurts any life-form. Although Buddhists and Hindus also recognize the principle of nonhurting as a fundamental rule of life, the Jains developed this principle most fully and carried its application the furthest. The term *nonhurting* is negative, but the principle is entirely positive, being rooted in a philosophy that recognizes the community of all living organisms and that sees love as the basis of relationship between all the members of this community. It embodies the realization that all life belongs to the same global family and that to hurt others is to destroy the community of life, which is the basis of all sacredness. According to Umasvati, the great Jain teacher of the second century, souls exist to provide service to each other. (p. 33)

There are numerous arguments used by Eastern systems to support practicing ahimsa. Two lines of such arguments explicitly assume that all sentient beings have souls that continue their existence after the death of physical bodies. Thus, for the context of this article, they are the most important.

First, *the arguments from an enlightened self-interest* assume that, depending on our actions in this life and previous ones, we may have more or less auspicious reincarnation (or rebirth). In particular, practicing kindness leads to more auspicious rebirths and the eventual liberation from *samsara* (or the world misery). Thus, for example, according to *Chandogya Upanishad* (VIII.XV): "He who is harmless (*ahimsant*) to all things elsewhere than at holy places . . . reaches the Brahma-world and does not return hither again" (as cited in Radhakrisnan & Moore, 1957, p. 77). The same reason is endorsed and explicated by Jainism by linking ahimsa with two central tenets of Jain metaphysics (i.e., *samvara*, or the principle of arresting the influx of karma, and *nirjara*, the principle of exhaustion of the accumulated karma). By practicing *ahimsa,* we stop the influx of karma, shed the old karma, and eventually achieve the total liberation (*moksha*; see Koller, 2012, Chapter

3). Finally, to round up the picture with a Buddhist view, in the *Lankavatara Sutra* (one of the most important texts of Mahayana Buddhism), Buddha asserts that all who follow in his steps "perceive that eating meat brings obstacles to liberation. And since they wish to benefit themselves and others, they do not eat meat of any kind" (as cited in Shabkar, 2004, p. 51). This first line of argument was eventually written in *The Codes of Manu* (about 100 CE) that again, like the Vedas, prohibit harms to animals except when it is done as a form of religious sacrifice:

> As many hairs as there are on the body of the sacrificial animal that he kills for no [religious] purpose here on earth, so many times will he, after his death, suffer a violent death in birth after birth. You can never get meat without violence to creatures with the breath of life. . . . Anyone who looks carefully at the source of meat, and at the tying up and slaughter of embodied creatures, should turn back from eating any meat. (5.38.48–53; as cited in Doniger, 2009, p. 317)

The second line of reasoning that supports the ideal of ahimsa may be called *the argument from kinship*. This argument is based on the assumption that, because of the indefinitely long cycle of multiple reincarnations (or rebirths), we are intimately related to each and every sentient being. Presumably, we do not want to eat beings who, at one time or another, belonged to our immediate family. To quote *Lankavatara Sutra* again:

> It is not easy . . . to come upon a being who, in the endless ages of samsara, has not been once your father or your mother, your brother or your sister, your son or daughter, kinsman, friend, or close companion. Your kith and kin in one existence, they have donned a different shape in later lives. They have become animals, wild or tame, beast or bird. (as cited in Shabkar, 2004, p. 48)

Similarly, according to *Angulimala Sutra*:

> There is not a single being wandering in the chain of lives, in endless and beginningless samsara, that was not your mother or your sister. An individual, born as a dog, may afterward become your father. . . . One's own flesh and the flesh of others is the same flesh. Therefore the Enlightened Ones eat no meat. Furthermore . . . *dharmadhatu* [pure mind] is the common nature of all beings, therefore Buddhas refrain from eating meat. (Shabkar, 2004, p. 64)

As we shall see in due course, both a version of the argument from an enlightened self-interest and a version of the argument from kinship reappear in Western contexts.

To move West, according to Daniel Dombrowski (1984), a belief in immortality and the transmigration of souls might have influenced ancient vegetarians. As he observes, the Orphics were a mystical cult practicing vegetarianism:

> Their motivation was probably connected to their belief in the transmigration of souls. Animals were animated with souls that would eventually be, or had previously been, found in a human body. . . .
>
> [The grandfather of ancient philosophical vegetarianism] Pythagoras was so sure of transmigration that he even admitted his own preexistence. Furthermore, through rites

> of purification, including abstinence from meat, one could remember previous lives. (Dombrowski, 1984, pp. 35, 36)

A view that has prevailed in the West rejected, however, the idea of reincarnation as it is grounded instead in the Christian tradition assuming that humans are made in the image of God. This meant in practice that humans were treated as unique beings endowed with the immortal souls and hope for the eternal salvation that, in turn, deeply influenced our attitudes to wars, gladiatorial combats, suicide, euthanasia, abortion, and so on. As E. H. Lecky (1892) expressed the point:

> What appealed so powerfully to the compassion of the early and medieval Christians, in the fate of the murdered infants, was not that they died, but that they commonly died unbaptized; and the criminality of abortion was immeasurably aggravated when it was believed to involve, not only the extinction of a transient life, but also the damnation of an immortal soul. In the "Lives of the Saints" there is a curious legend of a man who, being desirous of ascertaining the condition of a child before birth, slew a pregnant woman, committing thereby a double murder, that of a mother and of the child in her womb. Stung by remorse, the murderer fled to the desert, and passed the reminder of his life in constant penance and prayer. At last, after many years, the voice of God told him that he had been forgiven for the murder of the woman. But yet his end was a clouded one. He never could obtain an assurance that he had been forgiven the death of the child. (Vol. II, pp. 25–26)

There are numerous Christian philosophers assuming that the immortality of our souls gives humans a special moral status. For example, medieval philosopher Thomas Aquinas (1225–1274) maintained that animals are completely outside of the sphere of morality, and thus, we can do with them whatever we want (provided that our actions do not negatively affect human beings). Almost all Thomistic arguments assume that this is the case because humans have, while animals lack, minds of a rational and intellectual nature. Because beings of such nature exist for their own sake and are ends of the creation (i.e., everything else exists for the sake of such beings), humans must be taken care of for their own sake. By contrast, animals (and all other beings who lack rational nature) are but instruments to be used to support those who have rationality and intellect:

> Through these considerations we refute the error of those who claim that it is a sin for man to kill brute animals. For animals are ordered to man's use in the natural course of things, according to divine providence. Consequently, man uses them without any injustice, either by killing them or by employing them in any other way. (Aquinas, 1955–1957, Book 3, Part II, Chapter 112, 12)

There are, of course, some limitations on what we can do to animals. Invariably, their purpose is explicated in terms of reinforcing the proper attitude to those who are rational. For example:

> To turn the mind of man away from cruelty which might be used on other men, lest a person through practicing cruelty on brutes might go on to do the same to men; or because an injurious act committed on animals may lead to a temporal loss for some

> man, either for the agent or for another man. (Aquinas, 1955–1957, Book 3, Part II, Chapter 112, 13)

Similarly, as Aquinas (1947) observed in *Summa Theologica*: "He that kills another's ox, sins, not through killing the ox, but through injuring another man in his property. Wherefore this is not a species of the sin of murder but of the sin of theft or robbery" (Part II-II, Question 64:1, reply to Objection 3).

Interestingly enough, Aquinas considered also a form of the argument from kinship and, in particular, whether the virtue of charity can be extended to animals because of the "fellowship of everlasting happiness." He observed that this would entail that they are endowed with immortal souls. Responding to this argument, Aquinas assumed that there is a link between rationality and immortality. Consequently, he maintained that being irrational, animals cannot reach the eternal salvation in the afterlife. Thus, we cannot be charitable to them (Aquinas, 1947, Part II-II, Question 25:3).

A father of modern philosophy, René Descartes, employed quite similar considerations in his arguments that humans have a special moral status. Specifically, he maintained that we have independent substantial minds and, because of that, immortal souls (see, e.g., his *Sixth Meditation*). At the same time, he denied that animals have any genuine mental states, consciousness, or mind.[3] In the context of this article, it is important to notice that his position weaves together religious and moral claims. As he argued in his 1646 "A Letter to Marquise Newcastle":

> If they [animals] thought as we do, they would have an immortal soul like us. This is unlikely because there is no reason to believe it of some animals without believing it of all and many of them such as oysters and sponges are too imperfect for this to be credible. (as cited in Kenny, 1954, pp. 207–208)

Descartes explicated practical consequences of his view in 1649's "A Letter to Henry Moore," where he clearly excluded animals from the sphere of morality:

> My opinion is not so much cruel to animals as indulgent to men—at least to those who are not given to the superstitions of Pythagoras—since it absolves them from the suspicion of crime when they eat or kill animals. (Kenny, 1954, p. 245)

G. W. F. Leibniz (1956) spelled out a very similar argument in his letter to Herman Conring (March 19, 1678) where he observed that "whether there is some incorporeal substance in beasts which is called a sentient soul is something to be investigated by experiments for it is a question of fact" (Volume 1, p. 291). He maintains that we cannot be certain that animals have sentient souls unless we observe phenomena that cannot be explained in a purely mechanical way; in particular:

> If I were shown an ape who plays a game of highwayman or chess skillfully and successfully, even with men as opponents, I should certainly be forced to admit that there is something in him greater than a machine. But from that time on, I should become a Pythagorean and like Porphyry condemn the eating of animals and tyranny which men exercise against them. I should also provide for a place for their souls after death, for no incorporeal substance can be destroyed. (Leibniz, 1956, Volume 1, p. 291)

Let us immediately notice that neither Descartes nor Leibniz acknowledge profound differences between various animals and deep differences in complexity between various mental states and levels of consciousness. In particular, Leibniz seemed to believe that an activity as sophisticated as playing chess would be necessary to convince him that someone can feel even the most rudimentary pain and pleasure (or have other mental states). This seems indefensible. More importantly, however, both Descartes and Leibniz were motivated to adopt their views by moral considerations linked to their assumptions about the afterlife (and not just by purely empirical and metaphysical arguments about animals and their minds).

A similar position was endorsed by an 19th-century moral theologian and exponent of Thomism, Father Joseph Rickaby (1923), who maintained:

> Man alone speaks, man alone worships, man alone hopes to contemplate for ever . . . the Face of his Father in Heaven. . . . We have then no duties of charity, no duties of any kind, to lower animals, as neither to sticks or stones. (pp. 248–249)

We see again that he links granting someone any moral standing with this being having an immortal soul.

It would be mistaken, however, to think that these sorts of arguments have merely historical importance. On the contrary, they also have clear contemporary counterparts. One example is provided by a leading 20th-century Protestant theologian Paul Ramsey, who believed that having an immortal soul and the hope for the eternal salvation and life in the presence of God are essential for morality and moral considerability. Thus, he excluded animals from the spere of morality. Interestingly enough, having stated his official position, he immediately tried to smuggle animals back into this sphere through the back door:

> When they do not view man in the light of his position under God, men need not immediately become cruel or unnecessarily bloodthirsty. They will not at once begin to use their power over another's life with special brutality. But this does not mean that they find in the being of the neighbor something that essentially limits their rightful *dominion* over him. We grant just as much to the value of the lower animals in not inflicting upon them unnecessary pain. Yet they have no rights which we should not infringe. Since animals have feelings, no one approves of needless cruelty to them; but nevertheless we do not renounce our dominion over them, the dominion which, according to Genesis, God gave man over the brutes. We simply exercise our dominion with as little brutality as possible. Whenever necessary, we dispose of animals painlessly—or, as we say, grossly misusing language, "humanely." (Ramsey, 1956, p. 100)

It remains utterly unclear, however, why he thought we ought not to be cruel to animals. After all, he maintained that animals have no immortal souls, which, for him, seems to be a necessary condition for being included into the sphere of morality. So, given this assumption, it is hard to know why we should care about animals at all.

Even more recently, R. G. Frey (1977) wrote that one of "the best defenses" of the claim that all humans (including infants and severely mentally diminished people) have moral rights is based on the idea of immortality:

> If this argument is rejected on the grounds that, even if they possess immortal souls, beings must also possess rationality in order to have rights, or in the grounds that there is no good evidence for the existence of such souls, then neither babies nor the severely mentally-enfeebled possess rights. On the other hand, the religious argument does separate both from Fido, who is not conceded an immortal soul by the argument's proponents. (p. 188)[4]

A similar position has been considered by a leading American ethicist and philosopher of law, Richard Wasserstrom, in the context of discussing abortion and the moral status of a fetus. As he observed:

> At least two major arguments can be given in support of this position [that a fetus is like a fully developed human]. The first is a theological argument which fixes conception as the time at which the entity acquires a soul. And since possession of a soul is what matters morally and what distinguishes human beings from other entities, the fetus is properly regarded as like all other persons. (Wasserstrom, 1979, pp. 118–119)[5]

Finally, similar arguments are frequently encountered in the context of teaching courses on environmental ethics. In a brilliant exchange between Steve Paulson (2019) and a leading contemporary primatologist, Frans de Waal, the idea of human exceptionalism appears front and square. De Waal takes an issue with this idea and argues that big apes have morality, community, culture (or, in fact, a variety of cultures with unique customs and tool-making technologies that vary from one group to another), display grief for those who pass away, show forms of superstition, react with compassion to weaker ones, and show deep remorse for their past misdeeds. Facing numerous convincing examples illustrating these points, Paulson asks why so many people are still wedded to the idea that humans are special. Here is de Waal's reply:

> We're raised with those ideas. It's an old Christian idea that humans have souls and animals don't. I sometimes think it's because our religions arose in a desert environment in which there were no primates, so you have people who lived with camels, goats, snakes, and scorpions. Of course, you then conclude that we are totally different from the rest of the animal kingdom because we don't have primates with whom to compare ourselves. When the first great apes arrived in Western Europe—to the zoos in London and Paris—people were absolutely flabbergasted. Queen Victoria even expressed her disgust at seeing these animals. Why would an ape be disgusting unless you feel a threat from it? You would never call a giraffe disgusting, but she was disgusted by chimpanzees and orangutans because people had no concept that there could be animals so similar to us in every possible way. We come from a religion that's not used to that kind of comparison. . . . The social sciences and the humanities are still very influenced by religion. They have this whole mindset that humans are absolutely special. But the average biologist believes that everything is continuous. We know that plants have DNA and humans have DNA, so we see that all of us are totally connected. (Paulson, 2019)

Indeed, on numerous occasions of teaching courses on environmental and animal ethics I was confronted by the following argument: "You have offered numerous reasons for including animals into a sphere of morality. However, don't you think that since humans

have immortal souls and a hope for an eternal salvation, it gives us a radically different and privileged position compared to one occupied by animals?" The following fragment from a letter to the editor of *The New York Times*, expresses just this sentiment:

> Do animals have rights? One might think so .... There is an opposite view, which is succinctly given by the Rev. John A. Ryan in his booklet "The Norm of Morality." Father Ryan says that man's relations to lower beings can be summarily expressed as complete domination. . . . Despite emotional attitudes of sentimentalists and the fuzzy thinking of some ethicians [*sic*], animals have no more rights than cabbages or stone quarries. Being without spiritual souls, animals possess no intrinsic worth to be violated nor any personality to be developed. They have no need of rights (Oleksak, 1985, p. 22L).

This is the line of argument that will be considered in the rest of this article. In the next section, I will attempt to formulate conditions of adequacy for all arguments based on the immortality of souls. Subsequently, I will distinguish two general forms of such arguments and assess their strength.

TOWARD THE FORMULATION OF AN ARGUMENT: THE CONDITIONS OF ADEQUACY

It seems that all arguments from having a soul (AHS) must satisfy (at least) four conditions of adequacy.

Condition 1

Proponents of these arguments use them to distinguish the moral status of *all* humans from that of *all* animals. This imposes a very important constraint on the formulation of the argument; namely, they must assume that, as a matter of fact:

(FA) Every human but no animal has an immortal soul.

Let me explain. The term "soul" is ambiguous. Ancient philosophers used the term "ensouled" to express the idea that a being is alive. In particular, Aristotle was using the term "vegetative soul" to point to what is common for plants, animals, and humans. In turn, the term "sensitive soul" was used to point to qualities common for animals and humans. Only the term "rational soul" was used to point to mental qualities unique for humans (on these topics, see Lorenz, 2009). Some of these concepts informed philosophical writings through modern times. For example, Descartes and Leibniz used the terms "soul" and "mind" nearly interchangeably.

None of these concepts can be used, however, to distinguish the moral status of *all* humans from the moral status of *all* nonhuman animals. This is the case because many animals are more sensitive, intelligent, benevolent, self-conscious, capable of communicating effectively, and so on than some people. As contemporary psychologists observe, there are no mental characteristics of infants that would not be present in some grown-up mammals to the same or a higher degree. And, furthermore, there are some mental characteristics of animals that some humans lack; one of these features can be used to distinguish all humans from all animals. By contrast, immortality of souls may be just

such a feature. Consequently, it seems necessary to base arguments from having a soul on the factual assumption (FA).

Condition 2

Contrary to Aquinas, Descartes, and Leibniz, (AHS) needs to draw sharp conceptual, metaphysical, and causal distinctions between, on one hand, having an immortal soul and, on the other hand, standard mental features we associate with humans and animals. This is the case because otherwise (AHS) could not be used to distinguish all humans from all animals. Here is why: If some combination of mental features were to determine the immortality of a soul (like Aquinas, Descartes, and Leibniz, for example, claimed), (FA) would be false.

Someone may reject, of course, the claim that it is conceptually, metaphysically, and causally possible to separate immortality of soul from some combinations of mental features that someone has. Perhaps having a mind (and certain mental features) determines that a being also has an immortal soul. If this the case, however, then (AHS) collapses. For, as we have seen, there is nothing about human mental life that distinguishes all of us from all animals. Thus, if we were to assume some sufficiently tight connections between having some specific mental states and the immortality of soul, it would seem much more reasonable to assume also that either some animals have immortal souls or that some humans lack them. Either way, AHS would fail to provide a radical distinction between the moral standing of humans and the standing of animals.

Condition 3

The argument needs to spell out the metaphysical and causal relations between having immortal souls, having minds (as well as standard mental features), and having bodies. For example, substantial accounts of a soul, treating it as a self-sufficient and independent being (like one proposed by Descartes), run into the problem of mind-body dualism. Unifying accounts (like ones proposed by Aristotle and Aquinas) trade these problems for a different one. For, if a human soul is formed of a body necessarily unified with it, then how can it survive the death of a body? Furthermore, if the soul temporarily goes out of existence when the body dies and then comes back into existence at the moment of resurrection, then how do we know that a resurrected person (who is to be punished or rewarded for deeds committed by someone existing long before) is *identical* with the person who committed those deeds (rather than being merely a *perfect replica* of the doer)?

All of these conditions clarify only the factual (both empirical and metaphysical) assumption that the proponents of (AHS) must make. Since my goal here is to consider and refute the strongest possible version of (AHS), I will grant its proponents that all these problems have satisfactory solutions. In other words, I will not raise further worries about the nature of immortality and relations between immortal souls and mortal bodies. I will simply assume that the first three conditions of adequacy are fulfilled. From now on, I will focus only on the moral aspects of the argument.

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Condition 4

The proponents of (AHS) cannot simply assert that having an immortal soul is morally relevant. Rather, they need to provide a clear and nonarbitrary explanation to questions about *why*, and *to what extent*, immortality matters in a moral context. I will argue in the remainder of this article that proponents of (AHS) have never provided adequate answers to these questions. Consequently, they have never stated an argument helping us to see why animals have a different moral status than humans. This is the weak point of all versions of (AHS).

INCLUSIONARY ARGUMENTS FROM HAVING AN IMMORTAL SOUL

The first kind of AHS, so called inclusionary arguments, are based on moral premises formulated along the following line:

(MP) A being has a moral standing (MS) if and only if this being has an immortal soul.

To begin, I will not question here whether having immortality may be a *sufficient* condition for someone having moral standing. What exactly this standing amounts to would require further elucidation. I will discuss some related problems in due course, in this and the following sections. The main problem I want to focus upon now is whether or not having an immortal soul is also a *necessary* condition for including someone into the sphere of morality.

There are two lines of reasoning leading to the conclusion that immortality is *not* a necessary condition for having moral standing and inclusion into the sphere of morality. The first line is based on a thought experiment originally proposed by Sencerz (1988), involving a hypothetical planet, "*Thrae*," inhabited by a certain kind of beings, "*namuhs*." Let us suppose that namuhs are exactly like humans in all physical and mental respects. However, and this is consistent with all conditions of adequacy formulated above, namuhs do not have immortal souls. If having immortality were a necessary condition for having a moral standing, then namuhs would be outside of the sphere of morality. Consequently, it would be permissible to do with them whatever we feel like (provided we do not negatively affect beings who have immortal souls). In particular, it would not be either wrong, unjust, contrary to any virtue, or immoral in any other sense to withdraw from them all political liberties, to send them to factory farms where they would be raised under the conditions we currently use to raise animals, to slaughter them for food, to perform painful experiments on them just to see what may happen, or to send them to concentration camps and then torture them for fun or just for the sake of exploiting what may happen. These are all repugnant conclusions. Thus, immortality of a soul cannot be a necessary condition for having a moral standing.

There is a slightly different way in which we could argue for a similar conclusion. Consider the moral status of animals and the assumption that they do not possess immortal souls. Even proponents of (AHS) would be reluctant to say that we can do with them anything under any pretext (provided it does not negatively affect beings endowed

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with immortal souls). Suppose, for example, that an act A brings about some neutral (or even slightly positive) consequences for humans without causing anything of disvalue to anyone else. In particular, suppose that no one else experiences any significant suffering or is killed. By contrast, an act B has exactly the same consequences for humans but also has some extremely adverse consequences for others. In particular, they are forced to experience excruciating suffering and are eventually killed in an agonizing way. Hardly anybody, not even proponents of (AHS), would say that there is no moral difference at all between doing A and doing B. But the only difference between these actions is, *ex hypothesi*, that A does not cause others to suffer and die while B does. Hence, on the assumption that there is a moral difference between A and B, we must conclude that causing someone to suffer is morally wrong in itself and that it does not matter whether or not this being has an immortal soul. This forces us to reject having an immortal soul as a necessary condition for having a moral standing (a version of this argument is developed further in Sencerz, 2020).

Furthermore, if our arguments are correct, we have found at least one other condition that seems to be sufficient for attributing to someone moral standing. It is someone's ability to feel pain and suffering or pleasure and happiness. Having these abilities seem sufficient to support the moral claim that we should not maltreat either namuhs or, of course, animals (no matter whether or not they have immortal souls). From now on, let us assume that having an immortal soul is *not* a necessary condition for including someone into the sphere of morality.

Can it be, however, the case that having an immortal soul is either a sufficient or a necessary condition for giving someone a privileged position within this sphere? To explain what is at stake let us consider theological views assuming that God may be the only proper candidate for possessing total (or absolute) moral standing and total dominion over the rest of creation. On this view, we do not have any valid claims, or rights, against God and God does not have any duties to us. In principle, God may do with and to us whatever he wants. Consequently, whatever we receive from God is a matter of the divine grace rather than desert, entitlement, or justice. Views of these kinds illustrate the possibility that moral standing can be treated as a relational concept that explicates what is morally right and wrong in interactions between beings occupying different hierarchically ordered levels (see Nozick, 1974, pp. 35–49).

Per analogy, possessors of immortal souls can be treated as having standing with regard to nonpossessors in a relation analogous to the one between God and the rest of us. So, can immortality provide a basis for treating someone as having automatically an elevated position within the sphere of morality in relation to beings who do not have immortal souls? I will argue that this is not the case either.

To establish this point, let us revisit our planet Thrae. Assume that, by an interesting coincidence of various cultural and geographical factors, the majority of namuhs are vegetarians and vegans. Assume also that the *tnalps* eaten by them are exactly like our plants in almost all relevant respects. In particular, they are completely unable to feel pain, suffering, pleasure, or any emotions, and they are completely "uninterested" in ex-

ercising liberty or freedom in any morally interested sense. The only potentially relevant difference between tnalps and plants is that only the former have immortal souls.

Someone could object, of course, that this is impossible. But why not? Let us recall the conditions of adequacy for (AHS). We have assumed, in particular, that it is conceptually, metaphysically, and causally possible to be alive and even have various levels of consciousness while *not* having an immortal soul. Thus, in principle, an omnipotent God could create a planet inhabited by two categories of beings: Rational namuhs who do not have immortal souls and irrational tnalps who have immortal souls but hardly any level of consciousness. Consequently, we can legitimately raise questions about the moral status of such beings and their positions in a hypothetical moral hierarchy. In particular, we can consider whether or not, from a moral point of view, tnalps should be treated as normal earthly humans or like earthly plants. And we can also consider whether or not namuhs are morally obligated to exercise cannibalism rather than vegetarianism.

There seems to be no reason to think that tnalps have a different moral status from that of earthly plants. In particular, their having immortal souls does not seem sufficient for ascribing to them any serious moral rights, including a right to liberty and freedom from suffering. The claims that tnalps have such rights, and that those rights should never be violated by namuhs, are as nonsensical as saying that men have a right to terminate their pregnancies or that illiterate babies have a right to vote and that these rights can be violated. The parties cannot have these rights simply because they cannot have any interest in having such rights and could not have the slightest idea what to do with them. Hence, it would be absurd to grant such rights to them. Our thought experiments show that quite similar considerations apply to the immortality of souls. Neither having moral status in general nor having a privileged moral status seem to depend on having an immortal soul.

MODIFYING ARGUMENTS FROM HAVING IMMORTAL SOULS

There is a general problem with all arguments considered so far; namely, they try to bridge a gap between the soul's immortality and someone having a special moral standing in an overly "mechanical" way. They simply assume without any shred of explication that there is some sort of connection between these two factors. This is why they do not work. It seems we need to devote much closer attention to questions about why immortality matters morally. We need to consider, in particular, whether or not, and in what ways, the value of someone's life (and/or suffering, pleasure, and other valuable things involved in this life) may change (i.e., be enhanced or diminished) depending on whether or not one has an immortal soul.

A case can be made that none of the things that we normally consider to be morally relevant (e.g., neither life nor suffering nor satisfaction of one's desires) is automatically more valuable simply because someone has an immortal soul. To begin, we need to recognize one thing that is crucial (and yet frequently ignored) in this context; namely, what is at stake is *not* the value of a soul and *not* the value of a soul's existence and potential

salvation after the death of one's body. On the contrary, let us simply *stipulate*, for the sake of argument, that these values are indefinitely high, and thus, they trump all other considerations. Rather, we try to assess the value of a finite "part" of the eternal existence of someone who has hopes for immortality and the value of things (such as suffering and frustration of desires) that are included in this finite part. Specifically, our focus is on the value of the earthly life of someone and the value of what may happen in this earthly existence.

We have seen, in a previous section, that namuhs should continue with their vegetarianism and definitely should not devolve into cannibalism and raising other namuhs for food simply because they do not have immortal souls. This is the case because their lives on their planet have much greater value than the comparable value of tnalps' lives, even though tnalps have immortal souls. The fact that only tnalps have immortal souls did not elevate them above other beings.

But are there situations where the facts that someone has an immortal soul and the possibility of eternal salvation are morally significant? For example, do these facts alter the value of one's temporary existence in "flesh and blood"? Or, to put things in a slightly different way, do they alter the value of suffering and pleasure experienced during our fleeting bodily existence? It seems that, sometimes, this can be the case. Peter Singer (1980) expresses one way in which it may happen by posing the following rhetorical questions:

> If we compare the value of [their lives], is it not a little odd to say that the life of the human being in this world is far more valuable than the life of the nonhuman in this world because the human's life in this world is only an infinitely small fraction of its entire existence, whereas the nonhuman's life in this world is the entirety of its existence? Might we not, with at least equal plausibility, draw exactly the opposite conclusion? (pp. 227–228)

Similar considerations apply to the comparative value of pleasure and hope for immortality. At least one Christian theologian recognized and acknowledged just this point. Reportedly, Cardinal Bellarmine allowed vermin to bite him, saying, "We shall have heaven to reward us for our sufferings, but these poor creatures have nothing but the enjoyment of this present life" (Lecky, 1892, Volume II, p. 172). Now, this conclusion may seem extreme. But it may be stated in a weaker and much more plausible way that brings into sharper focus how immortality may affect other beings.

From the point of view of someone with hopes for immortality and the eternal salvation, some forms of suffering and hardship seem relatively less important and more tolerable. In some contexts, they may even seem necessary and helpful. Metaphorically speaking, they may be treated like a "valley" through which we must traverse before reaching the "mountain top" of salvation. Thus, the whole experience of suffering leading to salvation may be more valuable than salvation without going through suffering. To use a metaphor, risking everything during the arduous climb leading to the mountain top seems more valuable than just being transported there by some sophisticated machine

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or a miracle.[6] By contrast, for someone who has no chance for "immortality" and the eternal salvation, the same suffering and hardship is all that will ever happen to them. From this point of view, there is no eternal reward (or "compensation") at all for the bad things that happen in someone's life.

A similar point can be illustrated by an example from a secular context. It is relatively easy for me to go to a dentist or take some bitter medicine. The very same things may be prohibitively difficult for a little child. This is the case because of one important difference between us. Namely, I understand the relatively distant rewards of my actions. Consequently, I can use those expected rewards as motivational factors. By contrast, small children and animals have no such abilities. Suffering is all they have, and they lack the ability to see it in any broader compensatory context. In the context of death, some of us have hope for some sort of continuity and perhaps even salvation. Perhaps it helps us with our existential angst. From the animal point of view, their experiences on factory farms and then in slaughterhouses make no sense at all. They cannot understand it as a reward or punishment for past deeds, and they cannot expect anything positive in the future. For them, all that exists is horrific terror and pain. Exposing them to excruciating suffering seems even more unfair and unjust than it is when someone is somehow "compensated" for it in the eternity.

The beloved Anglican theologian and author C. S. Lewis (1970) recognized and acknowledged just this point in the following passage:

> The Christian defender of [vivisection] . . . is very apt to say that we are entitled to do anything we please to animals because they "have no souls." But what does this mean. . . . [The] absence of "soul" . . . makes the infliction of pain upon them not easier but harder to justify. For it means that animals cannot deserve pain, nor profit morally by the discipline of pain, nor be recompensed by happiness in another life for suffering in this. Thus all the factors which render pain more tolerable or make it less totally evil in the case of human beings will be lacking in beasts. "Soullessness," in so far as it is relevant to the question at all, is an argument against vivisection. (pp. 245–246)

The same point has been recognized quite recently by Andrew Linzey, one of the pioneers of including animals into the sphere of morality on the grounds of Christian theology. As he noticed in a recent book: "If animals are not going to be recompensed in some future life for the suffering that they have had to undergo in the present, it follows that their current suffering acquires even greater significance" (Linzey, 2009, p. 27).

To sum up, quite contrary to what we could have expected, the first modifying version of (AHS) does not exclude animals from a sphere of moral concern. It does not diminish their position within this sphere either. On the contrary, it seems to elevate their position within this sphere.

There is one final possibility for bridging a gap between immortality and the special moral standing of someone who has a moral soul. It is based on the assumption that certain things are in a soul's most fundamental interest. Numerous philosophers and theologians attempted to link the rationality of actions and beliefs, including the rationality of acting

in a morally required way, with the assumption that what we do and believe here may lead to eternal salvation. For example, the 17th-century French philosopher Blaise Pascal attempted to do it in his famous "Wager" (Pascal, 1670/1910, section 233).

Pascal envisaged that there are only two possibilities; namely, either God exists or not. Furthermore, we can take only one of two attitudes with respect to these possibilities; namely, we can believe in God and act accordingly or not. Supposedly, if God exists and someone believes in God (and acts accordingly), then one maximizes the chances of reaching eternal salvation. If God exists and someone does not believe in God (and/or does not act accordingly), then one maximizes the chances of reaching eternal damnation. If God does not exist, then it does not matter what one believes. Given these potential outcomes, it looks like everyone has a practical reason to believe that God exists (and to act accordingly).

We should immediately recognize that this argument is quite analogous to considerations offered by Hindu, Jain, and Buddhist sources that were discussed earlier. Let us recall that all these systems assume that proper actions (including practicing ahimsa) increase chances of an auspicious rebirth leading, perhaps, to the eventual complete liberation from the world of misery (samsara).

So, let us stipulate that there are some enormous benefits (and harms) potentially available only to the beings who have immortal souls. Namely, only they can reach an eternal salvation (or damnation), understood in Christian contexts as heaven (or hell) and, in Eastern contexts, as moksha or nirvana (or less than an auspicious rebirth, including rebirths in hells). Suppose also that the nature and blessings of our future existence depend on what we do during our earthly lives. In particular, the blessings of heaven and the misery of hell are the results of the present life because they are rewards or punishments for what we do with those lives. If this is the case, it may be reasonable to think that some obligations may be intimately related to what is in a soul's best interest. In particular, it may be our obligation not to do anything that will cause souls to suffer the misery of hell (or to be reborn in circumstances involving excruciating suffering).

First off, let us recognize that this is not an argument justifying ascribing to animals *generally* less privileged positions. Rather, it only supports a very narrow claim: that the soul's goodness (as well as what is bad for the soul, including a possibility of damnation) take precedent over other factors. To put it in the context of earlier discussed philosophers and their views, Aquinas assumed that intellect and rationality have paramount value. He inferred from this that we can do to animals and other beings who lack rationality whatever we want. But this conclusion is unwarranted. A much more plausible inference seems to be that rational beings can use animals in ways that further their intellectual nature (as opposed to in any way whatsoever). The distinction has enormous practical implications. It may justify using animals when our lives depend on it (e.g., in the conditions of subsistence). This is the case because, under such conditions, there is nothing else we can do to survive. But it does not justify eating them for pleasure, performing trivial experiments on animals, or trophy hunting. For none of these activities is necessary to further our intellectual nature.

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The second and very closely related point is this: The central moral premise of this version of (AHS) assumes that the special moral standing that we have is somehow related to the interests of a soul (including potential salvation and damnation). This premise cannot justify our typical forms of the treatment of animals—torturing millions of them in experiments, raising and slaughtering billions in order to consume their flesh, and exterminating whole species for the sake of expanding our empire of iron and concrete. For none of these practices has anything to do with the interests of our immortal souls. None of these activities is necessary or even conducive for salvation. Cardinal Belarmine's asceticism is way too radical for most of us. However, a practice of vegetarianism, or more stringent restrictions imposed on experiments with animals, do not seem nearly so extreme. Satisfying the basic moral status of animals could certainly be, at the same time, a good way of exercising virtue. Thus, animals may constitute valuable elements of life leading to full moral flourishing and potentially salvation. Consequently, our treatment of animals may help satisfy our obligations to our souls.

Third, and this is the most important point, we need to also determine what is the best strategy for increasing the chances of our soul's eternal salvation. Virtually all theologians agree that, at least in part, this strategy must include acting in a morally appropriate way. (It may also include fulfilling some religious or ceremonial duties. Both Hinduism and Christianity seem to make this assumption. By contrast, Jainism and Buddhism seem to emphasize the claim that the road to liberation is through actions rather than ceremonies and religious beliefs. To simplify the discussion, we will put all religious issues of these sorts to one side.)

One would have to argue now, on grounds somewhat independent of (AHS), that certain actions are morally required and that some forms of behavior are virtuous. If this is the case, however, then our duties to our immortal soul would be fulfilled automatically when we act morally and practice virtue. (Again, I put purely doxastic, ceremonial, and other religious considerations to one side.) If this is the case, however, then (AHS) would not create any new obligations. Rather, it would only add strength to the obligations we already have or, more precisely, to sanctions coming with whatever obligations we already may have.

Let me explain. Sometimes we wonder about reasons for acting morally and developing certain positive character traits (also known as virtues). One possible answer to these questions is in terms of sanctions (rewards and punishments) that come with morality. Putting considerations of immortality to one side, we might say that we should act morally because, otherwise, we will (and should) feel guilty (an internal sanction). In addition, when we break moral rules, others will (and should) give us a metaphorical "hard time" for acting so. For example, they may (and should) call us names such as "liar," "thief," "inconsiderate," "callous," "cruel," and so forth; in extreme cases, they may even ostracize us (external sanctions). Both internal and external sanctions are quite unpleasant to a doer providing motivation for correct moral behavior. The possibility of immortality adds another possible answer to the same; namely, we ought to act morally because it is, in a long run, in our enlightened self-interest. This is a plausible

sense in which the idea of immortality may add strength to the already existing moral requirements.

CONCLUSION

To sum up, some philosophers argue that arguments from having an immortal soul provide one of the best defenses of the idea that babies and severely mentally diminished people, but not animals, have a special moral standing. If the arguments in this article are correct, this is seriously doubtful. Arguments from having an immortal soul seem spurious in numerous ways. First, we can reasonably question whether anyone, humans or animals, have immortal souls. Next, if we assume that all humans have immortal souls, it seems unreasonable to claim that no animals can have such a soul. Finally, it is not clear what could follow from the assumptions that all humans and no animals have immortal souls. However, if any reasonable argument can be built on these assumptions, it seems likely to lead to the conclusion not only that animal interests should not be ignored in the process of satisfying human ones, but also that sometimes their satisfaction is more morally important than doing what seems to be "good" for us.

APPENDIX: THE BIBLE, ANIMAL ETHICS, AND THE IMMORTALITY OF ANIMAL SOULS

There are two principled ways of incorporating animals into the sphere of morality based on the biblical hermeneutic. The first involves an interpretation of dominion (that God gave us over the rest of creation) in terms of nonviolent and caring stewardship rather than violent subjugation. The second (and related one) links this interpretation more directly with the idea that animals may have immortal souls and can participate in spiritual life.

Regarding the former, there are numerous biblical passages lending credence to this sort of friendly hermeneutic. For example, as Ryan Patrick McLaughlin (2017) recently observes:

> Animals share the sixth day of creation with humans (Gen 1:24–31). In Genesis 2:18–19, animals are not created as resources for Adam, but rather companions with Adam. In Genesis 9:8–9, animals, as well as the Earth itself, are included in the Noahic covenant. The Psalmist claims that God saves humans and animals alike (Ps 36:6). . . . Isaiah 11:1–9 presents an edenic vision of cosmic harmony that includes animals. (McLaughlin, 2014, Chapter 6)

And again,

> Jesus compares his love for his followers to a "good" shepherd who cares deeply for his sheep (John 10:1–16). Jesus does maintain that humans are worth more than sparrows—but not that sparrows have no worth (Matt 10:29–31). . . . Paul suggests that the entire groaning creation will participate in the glory of the liberated children of God (Rom 8:18–22). . . . The cosmic christologies of Colossians 1:15–20 and Ephesians 1:3–10 portray a cosmic reconciliation. (McLaughlin, 2017, p. 145)

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McLaughlin (2017) does not argue that "the Bible presents a monolithic view with regard to the moral status of nonhuman animals" (p. 146). On the contrary, the scripture includes also passages lending credence to the ethics of anthropocentrism and violent subjugation. But the same is the case about other moral issues, too (e.g., the issues related to women rights and slavery). Still, he clearly demonstrates how animal-friendly passages were used by a number of contemporary biblical scholars and theologians to promote the extension of theological and moral concerns beyond the scope of the human community. Thus, he maintains that "a careful exegesis of particular biblical passages reveals the possibility of an animal-friendly hermeneutic, one that portrays the ideal relationship between humans and nonhumans as one of nonviolence" (McLaughlin, 2017, p. 146; see also McLaughlin, 2014).

Regarding the second strategy, more directly related to linking the moral status of animals with immortality and the possibility of eternal salvation, I cannot demonstrate that the Bible directly states or implies that animals have immortal souls and will survive after the death of their bodies. What I can show is merely that this idea is not directly excluded by the scripture and that it is even suggested by some fragments of both the Old and the New Testaments. In this context, the key fragment of the Old Testament says:

> Surely the fate of human beings is like that of the animals; the same fate awaits them both: As one dies, so dies the other. All have the same breath; humans have no advantage over animals. Everything is meaningless. All go to the same place; all come from dust, and to dust all return. Who knows if the human spirit rises upward and if the spirit of the animal goes down into the earth?" (Eccl 3:19–21; all quotations from the *New International Version*)

Many traditional interpretations of this fragment claim merely that humans, like animals, must die, and in this respect man, although alone in nature having a vision of immortality, has no advantage over animals. However, this fragment actually says a bit more. The key word in this fragment is *ruah*, usually translated as either "breath" or "spirit." This term should be distinguished from another Hebrew word, *nephesh*, which stands for "soul" or "personality." Used in this sense, the death involves the ending of someone's personality. In contrast to nephesh, ruah-spirit survives this death and, according to the same book, goes to *Sheol* (see Eccl 9:10). Now, since people and animals have the same spirit (ruah), and since our spirit seems to be immortal, we have a reason to conclude that the spirit of animals is also immortal.

This interpretation is compatible with Psalm 36:6, which states: "Your righteousness is like the highest mountains, your justice like the great deep. You, Lord, preserve both people and animals." The crucial term used here—*yesa*—is usually translated as "preserve" in a sense of providing conditions conducive to well-being, outward and inward prosperity, and inner peace. But in a more fundamental sense, the term means saving someone from earthly, cosmic, and demonic enemies. This would clearly suggest that animals are able to have a spiritual life and are supported in this by God.

There are also quite a few fragments in the New Testament that support this interpretation. First, Mark attributes to Christ the following words: "Go into all the world and

preach the gospel to all creation" (Mark 16:15). If animals were unable to participate in a spiritual life and to attain a spiritual salvation, it would be nonsensical to give to the apostles the command of preaching the gospel to them. Also having an immortal soul may be required for having a spiritual life and salvation in a biblical sense.

Someone could reply, of course, that "all creation" is only a metaphorical suggestion that in no way includes animals. St. Matthew, for example, attributes to Christ slightly different words requiring apostles preach to "all nations" (Matt 28:19). Be it as it may, the fact is that the apostles took quite seriously the possibility that this scripture includes all animals and possibly even the earth as a whole. Thus, for example, Paul observes in Colossians 1:23: "This is the gospel that you heard and that has been proclaimed to every creature under heaven, and of which I, Paul, have become a servant."

And in the letter to the Romans, he promises a salvation to all animals:

> I consider that our present sufferings are not worth comparing with the glory that will be revealed in us. For the creation waits in eager expectation for the children of God to be revealed. For the creation was subjected to frustration, not by its own choice, but by the will of the one who subjected it, in hope that the creation itself will be liberated from its bondage to decay and brought into the freedom and glory of the children of God. (Rom 8:18–21)

Christian theologians have found in these and similar fragments enough material for developing a theology of liberation and salvation for animals.[7] It seems only an accident of history that such a theology has not yet been fully developed.

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NOTES

1. It is good to acknowledge, however, a slight dissent. Some philosophers, notably Rosalind Hursthouse (2006), prefer not to formulate their views in terms of moral status or standing. Hursthouse argues, nevertheless, that some ways of treating animals would be automatically included into various forms of virtuous activities. (MS) intends to classify such a view as implying that animals have some moral standing and are included in a sphere of morality.

2. Robert Nozick (1974, pp. 35–49) considered a possibility of hierarchical views of these sorts and introduced in this context his maxim of "utilitarianism for animals, Kantianism for people" (p. 37). This is not to imply that he also endorsed this maxim.

3. Descartes's views on these topics are more complex than is usually assumed. For, in fact, he admits that animals have some forms of sensations. For a discussion, see Sencerz, 1990.

4. In a more recent statement of his position, Frey (1980) calls this argument "traditional" rather than "best" (p. 32).

5. The parallels and differences between arguments for the ethical treatment of animals and

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the arguments against abortion are examined more fully by Dombrowski and Deltete (2006); see especially "Afterword: Argument from Marginal Cases," pp. 121–130. The authors argue that, in both contexts, the strongest arguments are based on the premise that someone actually is sentient. Thus, they do not focus on the arguments from having an immortal soul.

6. This is, in fact, one of the main points of the so-called Irenaean or "soul building" reply to the problem of evil, originally proposed by Irenaeus (130–202) and recently developed by John Hick (2007).

7. See, for example, Andrew Linzey (1976, 1986, 1995, 2007, 2009) and Ryan Patrick McLaughlin (2014, 2017).

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